A merchant ship in the Strait of Hormuz, July 5, 2004. File photo, not the current crisis. Angel Roman-Otero / U.S. Navy, via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain; unmodified.
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An oil purchase is not complete when a contract is signed. For Asian importers, the cargo must also pass safely through the Strait of Hormuz and reach a refinery on time. That practical test remains unresolved as Washington and Tehran argue over a proposal to reopen the waterway.
President Donald Trump rejected Iran’s proposal on September 26, then said the following day that he expected further talks during the week. Iran said reopening depended on its conditions being met and that it was awaiting a formal response through mediators, Reuters reported. Those statements leave room for diplomacy; they do not establish an agreement or a reopening date.
A contract cannot guarantee a voyage
Japan’s oil industry offers a concrete example of how buyers are coping. In prepared remarks on September 18, Petroleum Association of Japan chairman Shunichi Kito said companies were arranging alternative crude supplies while safe navigation through Hormuz had yet to be restored. He also pointed to the value of domestic refining, procurement capacity and oil reserves in managing the crisis.
These measures address different problems. Procurement finds a seller. Reserves buy time when deliveries are interrupted. A refinery turns crude into usable fuel. None, on its own, makes an unsafe shipping route dependable.
The distinction matters when assessing claims of recovery. A buyer may secure enough cargoes for its immediate needs while still facing difficult transport arrangements. Conversely, a ship passing through the strait says little about whether the next cargo can make the same journey safely.
Asia has a direct stake in the terms
The exposure is rooted in geography. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that 89% of crude oil and condensate passing through Hormuz in the first half of 2025 went to Asian markets. Condensate is a light liquid hydrocarbon. China, India, Japan and South Korea were the leading destinations. This is a historical measure of where those cargoes went, not a statement that 89% of Asia’s oil imports use the strait. EIA data also show that alternative pipelines can replace only part of the route’s oil flows.
Japan has publicly connected energy security with the rules governing passage. In a September 8 call with Iran’s foreign minister, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi sought the early restoration of free and safe navigation without additional costs. Tokyo also said the waterway’s future should be discussed under international law by the wider international community, including countries using it.
For importers, this raises a question beyond when ships can move: under what conditions can they keep moving? A temporary exception or uncertain permission is a weak basis for planning regular deliveries.
Why a diplomatic opening may not lower costs immediately
A political announcement would be an important step, but companies would still need confidence in actual passage and delivery schedules. If uncertainty persists, buyers may seek different suppliers, change shipping arrangements or hold larger buffers. Those choices can add costs even when fuel remains available.
The effects would vary across Asia. Buyers with dependable alternative supplies and usable reserves have more room to adjust. Those needing replacement cargoes at short notice could face greater pressure. Higher delivered fuel costs may eventually reach freight charges, air fares or household spending, but contracts, inventories and domestic pricing policies affect how quickly that happens.
That is why renewed talks should be judged against operational evidence: sustained safe voyages, dependable arrivals and more predictable transport costs. Asia’s interest is in a route on which the next delivery can be planned, not merely the last one celebrated.