Zhang Youxia (second from left) at a meeting in Russia on December 7, 2017. File photo; not the 2026 disciplinary proceedings. Photo: Kremlin.ru / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY 4.0. Resized.
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By E.K.K · September 22, 2026 · News & analysis · 繁體中文
China’s Communist Party Politburo decided on September 21 to expel Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the party and refer their suspected criminal offenses to military prosecutors for review and prosecution. The Xinhua announcement also disclosed that the Central Military Commission had already expelled both men from military service. The case has advanced from investigation earlier this year to party sanctions and a referral for criminal proceedings.
The announcement accuses the two men of factional activity, disloyalty and taking large payments in connection with promotions. These are official investigative allegations. It provides no precise amounts, detailed evidence or court verdict. Referral to prosecutors does not constitute a conviction. The party expulsions remain subject to ratification at a Central Committee plenary meeting. Official announcement via People’s Daily Online.
Zhang previously served as a CMC vice chairman and Liu as chief of its Joint Staff Department, placing them at senior levels of military leadership and operational planning. Their investigations were announced in January, and they were removed from their positions on the state CMC in August. The September announcement therefore advances an existing case rather than marking their sudden departure from the command structure. CNA’s September 21 report.
Why has the purge continued?
Available evidence points to overlapping concerns about corruption, personnel control and readiness. It does not establish the underlying motive in every case or the relative weight of those factors.
Corruption and patronage may reinforce each other. The official statement combines allegations about bribery, promotions and factions. AHR’s interpretation is that investigations can follow relationships between patrons and beneficiaries, extending beyond an individual officer. However, public evidence is insufficient to reconstruct Zhang and Liu’s alleged networks or place every other dismissed officer in the same faction. Official announcement.
Political control is another factor. A February 2026 CSIS study examines efforts to break up military patronage networks and reinforce obedience to party leadership. In that reading, replacing senior officers also reasserts control over appointments and command. It does not prove that Zhang or Liu organized a coup or openly refused orders. CSIS analysis.
Readiness provides a further explanation. Examining officers’ career records in March 2026, National Defense University researcher Joel Wuthnow argued that cleaning up corruption-prone parts of the PLA to support its 2027 centennial readiness goals better explains many cases than factional politics alone. That is an analytical assessment, not a disclosed account of Beijing’s internal deliberations. A capability goal for 2027 should not be presented as a decided date for war. Wuthnow’s study.
Does replacing generals improve military effectiveness?
Removing officers who have lost the leadership’s trust can also create vacancies and drain experience. Wuthnow argues that the scale of the purge has probably set back readiness. The repeated investigations also expose a governance problem: being able to dismiss powerful officials does not mean earlier demands for discipline and professionalism were implemented effectively. Wuthnow’s study.
For AHR, the practical questions concern replacements, handovers and subsequent exercises. Greater political control, better military performance and stable command may conflict in the short term. Personnel announcements alone cannot establish that war is imminent or that the threat has disappeared.
Asian security: command disruption and daily pressure can coexist
The formal sanctions follow earlier investigations and removals. Their regional significance should be assessed as part of the broader personnel upheaval, rather than attributing prior command changes to the September 21 announcement.
In the Taiwan Strait, vacancies and frequent handovers may complicate coordination across services, particularly for major operations. This is an organizational risk, not a complete assessment of readiness in September. It does not directly measure the probability of an invasion or establish that air and maritime pressure will stop. CSIS study of the purges.
Around Japan and in the South China Sea, the record shows that purges and external pressure can occur together. A CSIS review published in February found that Chinese military activity increased overall during 2025 in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, near Japan and beyond the First Island Chain. Coast guard operations also contributed to pressure in the South China Sea. These historical observations cannot predict the response to the latest sanctions, but caution against assuming that leadership changes will ease pressure on Japan, the Philippines or other coastal states. CSIS regional activity review.
Crisis communication is a separate issue to watch. AHR assesses that unclear authority during handovers, or reluctance to report bad news under political pressure, could complicate decisions after an air or maritime incident. This is a conditional risk assessment. There is no evidence here that these expulsions have interrupted a specific hotline or caused frontline forces to lose control. Continued military dialogue, identifiable points of contact and timely exchanges after incidents are observable indicators.
Longer-term outcomes may differ from immediate disruption. Effective successors could rebuild coordination and improve military performance; constrained professional advice could instead increase miscalculation. These are possibilities, not established outcomes. CSIS analysis.
The next verifiable developments include Central Committee ratification, any announcement of prosecution, appointments to relevant military posts, and sustained changes in regional exercises and military communication.
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