Neodymium magnet removed from a hard drive, 2010. File photo illustrating an end use of rare earths, not material from Myanmar. Tremaster / Wikimedia Commons / Public domain.
By Evan Liu
Washington is linking its diplomacy toward Myanmar with potential access to rare-earth resources. A U.S. country strategy described in Reuters reporting on November 2 connects efforts toward a ceasefire and political negotiations with opportunities for American business. It sets objectives; it does not announce a mineral supply agreement.
The strategy was approved on August 31 and published on October 16. Its reported goals include supporting a path toward lasting peace by 2030 and securing at least three major commercial or investment deals worth more than $5 million each. Neither the date nor the deal targets should be read as a completed outcome.
Myanmar’s resources make the interest understandable. Getting those resources into a reliable industrial supply chain, however, requires more than contact with the government in Naypyidaw.
Mining is only one part of the chain
Myanmar supplies heavy rare earths including dysprosium and terbium. These materials can help certain high-performance magnets retain their properties at high temperatures. Such magnets have applications in vehicles, wind turbines, industrial equipment and some defense systems.
Myanmar’s role is particularly important in heavy rare-earth feedstock. Much of the raw material has entered China for further processing.
The IEA puts China’s 2024 share of magnet rare-earth separation and refining at about 91%, and its share of sintered permanent-magnet manufacturing at about 94%. These measures refer to different stages and product groups; they cannot be added together or treated as current production figures.
This is the commercial difficulty for any buyer seeking an alternative supply chain. Access to ore does not provide the facilities, expertise and customers needed to turn it into usable materials and finished components. Without additional processing capacity outside China, a new mining arrangement may leave much of the existing dependence intact.
Who can guarantee access?
The Kachin Independence Army took control of important mining areas near China in late 2024. Fighting and changes in territorial control disrupted production and trade. Central-government approval therefore would not necessarily secure every deposit or transport route.
Companies would need workable arrangements with the authorities that exercise control locally. They would also need electricity, chemicals, transport and dependable border access. A change in the security situation could undermine any of those requirements.
Sanctions are another constraint. Renewed U.S. contact does not itself remove restrictions on military-linked individuals and entities. Nor does a diplomatic objective establish that a particular transaction is lawful or commercially feasible.
Mining also brings environmental and local-governance questions. Water contamination, land damage and the distribution of revenues matter to communities as well as investors. A supply arrangement that ignores those issues could deepen grievances rather than support stability.
Political and industrial progress require different evidence
For ASEAN, the initiative adds a commercial dimension to a conflict it has struggled to address through the Five-Point Consensus. Investor interests, community priorities and the objectives of armed groups will not necessarily align.
The next tests are whether negotiations include actors controlling the relevant areas, whether legal and security conditions permit investment, and whether processing capacity can turn prospective output into products buyers need. Peace talks, mining agreements and refinery construction each address a different part of the problem.
Myanmar’s minerals have clear strategic importance. Washington’s engagement could create opportunities, but reliable supplies will require sustained political arrangements and industrial investment. The policy document alone establishes neither.
Sources and editorial note
Edited bilingual edition of Evan Liu’s contribution to the Asia Horizon Review publication. Repetition has been condensed, source notes added and planned outcomes distinguished from completed actions. The author’s central analysis is retained.
Evan Liu — Medium original / 刊物原稿
Reuters, November 2: U.S. Myanmar strategy
IEA: Rare Earth Elements, executive summary