,

China and the Philippines Keep Talking. What Would Make the South China Sea Safer?

A November 3 call addressed upcoming regional meetings, but the public accounts offer little evidence of changes at sea.

By

·

3 min read
拉扎羅2025年7月1日在馬可仕面前宣誓就任菲律賓外長,非本次召見現場

Theresa Lazaro takes her oath before President Marcos, July 1, 2025. File photo, not the November 3 phone call. Presidential Communications Office / Wikimedia Commons · Public domain

China and the Philippines have agreed to keep diplomatic channels open following a November 3 call between their foreign ministers. Manila said the discussion also covered arrangements for leaders attending regional meetings this month. The call preserves a way to manage disagreements; the public accounts do not yet establish that risks at sea have fallen.

Two accounts of the same conversation

The Philippine account emphasized mutual respect and a more predictable relationship. Beijing's account retained a warning: Wang Yi accused some Philippine politicians of damaging relations and urged caution on maritime issues. Those accusations describe China's position, not an independently established account of Philippine conduct.

Agreement to keep talking should therefore be read narrowly. It does not mean the governments agree about who caused their disputes or how to resolve them.

Both have an immediate reason to keep multilateral meetings working. The Philippines chairs ASEAN this year, while China is hosting the APEC leaders' meeting in Shenzhen. Preventing bilateral arguments from disrupting those gatherings serves a practical purpose even when the underlying disagreements remain.

Diplomatic arrangements and decisions at sea

For Manila, chairing ASEAN requires attention to other members' priorities alongside its own maritime interests. Allowing every disagreement with Beijing to dominate the agenda would make that harder. China, meanwhile, can maintain regional engagement without abandoning its demands of the Philippines.

This gives both governments room to pursue dialogue without presenting it as a concession. It also explains why a successful meeting need not immediately produce a safer encounter between vessels.

For crews, what matters is how ships approach one another, whether radio calls receive a response, and who can be reached when an incident occurs. Courteous treatment of visiting leaders cannot substitute for those arrangements.

There is still value in an open channel

The accounts reviewed for this article do not set out new operational rules or an implementation timetable. That limits what can be claimed about the call's results. It does not make the conversation pointless: during a crisis, a functioning channel can help officials clarify intentions before an incident escalates.

The opposite risk is to mistake warmer diplomatic language for lasting restraint. If hazardous encounters continue, the accurate conclusion would be that political communication has improved while operational risks remain. A temporary pause around a summit would also need to be distinguished from a durable change.

The next assessment should put diplomatic contacts alongside events at sea. Procedures acknowledged by both sides, workable supply arrangements, or a sustained and verifiable reduction in dangerous encounters would provide stronger evidence of progress. Until then, the call is a means of managing the dispute, with its practical effects still to be tested.

Sources

Chinese Foreign Ministry, November 3 account

Reuters, November 4, syndicated

DZRH, November 4, Philippine DFA statement

Continue Reading

Share this article


Discover more from Asia Horizon Review

A concise weekly briefing on Asian security, defense technology and international strategy. No daily clutter.