LNG tanker Gulf Energy at anchor in Norway, 20 May 2023. File photo illustrating seaborne energy transport, not an ASEAN delivery or the current event. Gordon Leggett / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0. Source image unchanged; display may crop.
By Evan Liu · 繁體中文
Before the Middle East crisis, about 60% of Southeast Asia’s crude oil imports came from the Middle East, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). As geopolitical tensions threaten energy supplies, ASEAN faces a larger question: can one of the world’s fastest-growing economic regions continue expanding while becoming increasingly dependent on imported energy?
The latest tensions in the Middle East are exposing an uncomfortable reality for Southeast Asia: economic growth does not automatically bring energy security.
ASEAN energy ministers have been discussing regional energy security in Manila. The IEA reports that about 60% of the region’s crude oil imports came from the Middle East before the crisis. AEO9, the ASEAN Centre for Energy’s ninth regional energy outlook, says up to 28% of final oil consumption was exposed to disruption at the Strait of Hormuz. These figures describe different measures; neither is a confirmed loss of that share of consumption.
The bigger issue is therefore not simply how much the next barrel of oil will cost.
It is:
Why is Southeast Asia becoming more vulnerable to imported energy as its economy grows?
Growth Is Increasing Energy Dependence
Southeast Asia’s energy demand is rising rapidly.
Population growth, manufacturing, urbanization, data centers and transportation are all increasing the region’s need for electricity and fuel. But domestic oil and gas production has not expanded at the same pace.
The IEA estimates that under a pathway without structural change, annual energy import costs could grow from over $80 billion in 2024 to about $245 billion in 2035. This is a conditional projection, not a bill already incurred.
That makes energy dependence more than a security issue.
It is also an economic one.
Higher prices or supply disruptions can raise manufacturing costs, transportation expenses, electricity prices and inflation.
For a region trying to attract global supply chains, affordable and reliable energy is itself a competitive advantage.
Reserves Buy Time, Not Independence
ASEAN is not unprepared.
The region already has mechanisms for petroleum-security cooperation during supply disruptions, while individual countries maintain different levels of strategic and commercial fuel reserves.
But stockpiles can only buy time.
If a crisis lasts for weeks or months, energy security ultimately depends on whether supply sources are diversified and whether the region can develop alternatives to imported fossil fuels.
That is why the debate is moving beyond simply storing more oil.
Energy reserves are a buffer, not a long-term strategy.
The larger challenge is reducing dependence on individual suppliers, routes and energy sources.
The Longer-Term Answer May Be the Grid
That brings renewed attention to one of ASEAN’s long-running ambitions: the ASEAN Power Grid.
The idea is straightforward. More interconnected national electricity systems would allow countries facing shortages to import power from their neighbors, while making it easier to move hydroelectric, solar and wind power across borders.
Combined with renewable-energy investment, electric vehicles and greater energy efficiency, deeper regional power integration could gradually reduce Southeast Asia’s exposure to imported fossil fuels.
None of this will eliminate the region’s need for Middle Eastern oil tomorrow.
But it could determine how vulnerable ASEAN is when the next energy crisis arrives.
That is the larger lesson from today’s concerns.
The Middle East crisis may have pushed the issue back into focus, but the underlying problem is structural:
The evidence suggests that stronger energy resilience is needed as Southeast Asia’s energy demand grows.
If ASEAN wants to remain a major destination for manufacturing, investment and global supply chains, its future competitiveness may depend on more than factories, labor costs or trade agreements.
It may increasingly depend on whether the region can secure enough energy, at predictable prices, without relying too heavily on any single source.
Editorial update, October 9, 2026: AEO9, released October 8, sets out 2030 policy targets: renewables at 30% of primary energy supply and 45% of installed power capacity, and primary energy intensity 40% below 2005. Capacity is not electricity generated; intensity means energy used per unit of economic output. These are targets, not achieved results.
Its Baseline Scenario projects final energy consumption rising from 485 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 2025 to 2,047 million in 2060—about 4.2 times the starting level. A coordinated transition scenario reaches 1,073 million. These are conditional model outcomes, not inevitable forecasts.
Reuters reported on October 8 (syndicated report) that Japan and partners agreed reserve action plans and ASEAN reached a preliminary grid agreement. The Philippines aims to establish a national reserve by end-2027. These agreements and plans do not establish completed reserves or a completed regional grid.
About This Article
This article is based on publicly available information from the International Energy Agency, Reuters and ASEAN energy-security initiatives. Energy-supply risks remain subject to changes in geopolitical conditions, prices and national inventories.
The original analysis reflected information available on October 6, 2026. AHR checked the key figures and added the above update on October 9 using AEO9, IEA material and Reuters. Country-level reserve volumes and activation of regional emergency arrangements remain unverified.
Written and reported by Evan
ASEAN · Energy · Trade & Economy · Southeast Asia
Source record: Evan Liu, AHR contributor article originally published on Medium. This page contains the complete article text. The original AHR file photograph and its credit are retained.